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INTRODUCTION 
Initial coin offerings (“ICOs”) are one of the hottest topics in 
corporate finance. An ICO is a form of crowdfunding where start-ups 
or online projects raise money by creating and selling their own 
virtual tokens.1 Seemingly free from the burdens of registration under 
the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act” or “Act”),2 ICOs 
attracted almost $4 billion in investments in 2017, exceeding the total 
value of venture capital investments in blockchain projects.3 
The Securities Act requires that, absent an exemption, all 
offerings and sales of securities be registered with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Registration requires certain 
disclosure documents.4 These include a prospectus—which details the 
company’s business, management, and financial performance—and 
periodic reports filed with the SEC that disclose the company’s 
operating performance to investors.5 Securities issuers incur 
substantial costs to comply with SEC registration and periodic 
reporting requirements. In an initial public offering, issuers incur, on 
average, underwriter fees of between 4% and 7% of the gross 
proceeds, plus an additional $4.2 million in legal, accounting, and 
other costs directly attributable to the offering.6 Additionally, the 
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 1. Nathaniel Popper, An Explanation of Initial Coin Offerings, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/technology/what-is-an-initial-coin-offering.html 
[https:// perma.cc/K7V3-AFHF]. For a more detailed background on ICOs, see OFFICE OF 
INV’R EDUC. & ADVOCACY, SEC, INVESTOR BULLETIN: INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS 
(2017), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_coinofferings [https://perma.cc/
8MX8-ZYNJ]. 
 2. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§	77a–77aa (2012)). 
 3. ERNST & YOUNG, EY RESEARCH: INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS (ICOS) 6 (2017), 
www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-research-initial-coin-offerings-icos/$File/ey-research-
initial-coin-offerings-icos.pdf [http://perma.cc/8PSD-VFRB]. 
 4. See 15 U.S.C. §	77g (2012) (identifying “[i]nformation required in registration 
statement” and accompanying documents). 
 5. See id. §§	77e(b), 78m(a). 
 6. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONSIDERING AN IPO TO FUEL YOUR 
COMPANY’S FUTURE? INSIGHT INTO THE COSTS OF GOING PUBLIC AND BEING PUBLIC 
20 (2017), https://www.pwc.com/hu/hu/szolgaltatasok/konyvvizsgalat/szamviteli-tanacsadas/
kiadvanyok/cost_of_an_ipo_2017.pdf [http://perma.cc/NM7D-NNZE]. These are average 
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average public company incurs costs of at least $1 million annually to 
comply with SEC regulations.7 
Many promising early-stage start-ups seek financing from 
venture capital funds or other private investors. Typically, to obtain 
venture capital financing, start-up founders must sell some of their 
equity in the growing business. The regulatory burden is lower than 
conducting a public offering, but founders often must cede some 
degree of control over the management of the business, as well as a 
portion of their interests in their businesses’ profits.8 
Prior to December 2017, many viewed ICOs as falling outside 
the reach of federal securities laws and SEC jurisdiction despite 
indications that the SEC intended to regulate these offerings.9 
Because of this, ICOs appeared to be a source of financing that 
avoided the burdens associated with a registered offering and lacked 
the downsides of obtaining private financing. Entrepreneurs who 
chose to conduct ICOs believed that cryptocurrency offered a way to 
finance growth (while avoiding SEC oversight and regulations) and 
maintain full control over operations and profits of the growing 
business.10 
In December 2017, the SEC instituted cease and desist 
proceedings against Munchee Inc. in Munchee Inc. (proceedings 
referenced throughout as “Munchee”), finding that its ICO was an 
unregistered securities offering in violation of section 5 of the 
Securities Act.11 This Recent Development argues that the SEC’s 
reasoning in Munchee is far-reaching and that its enforcement action 
represents a turning point for the cryptocurrency industry, calling into 
question the continued usefulness of ICOs as a form of financing.  
The analysis proceeds in five parts. Part I lays out the facts of 
Munchee. Part II analyzes the SEC’s application of the “Howey test” 
 
costs, and in more complex offerings, issuers may incur substantially higher legal and 
accounting fees. 
 7. Id. These include accounting and legal costs necessary to comply with the 
Securities Exchange Act and SEC regulations. 
 8. See infra Section IV.A (evaluating the benefits of an ICO after the SEC’s 
enforcement action against Munchee Inc.). 
 9. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(A) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207, 2017 WL 7184670, at *1 (July 
25, 2017) (discussing inconclusive SEC investigation into virtual tokens). 
 10. See Popper, supra note 1. 
 11. Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445, 118 SEC Docket 5, at 1–2 (Dec. 
11, 2017) (SEC cease and desist order). 
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from SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,12 which courts use to determine 
whether an “investment contract” is a security. Part III discusses the 
implications of Munchee on future ICOs, proposing that future 
offerings must register with the SEC or fit one of several poorly 
tailored existing exemptions. Part IV questions the costs and benefits 
of raising capital through a regulated ICO post-Munchee and suggests 
that, in many cases, ICOs are no longer an attractive form of 
financing. Finally, Part V argues that, despite severe consequences for 
the cryptocurrency industry, the SEC’s decision to intervene in the 
cryptocurrency markets was in line with its mission to protect 
investors; ensure fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate 
capital formation. 
I.  MUNCHEE INC. OVERVIEW 
In Munchee, the SEC definitively determined that certain 
cryptocurrencies offered in ICOs fit the definition of “securities” 
under the Securities Act13 and are therefore subject to the Act’s 
registration requirements.14 The respondent, Munchee Inc., was a 
typical ICO issuer: an early stage start-up business that chose to raise 
capital through an unregulated ICO rather than seek venture capital 
funding.15 The company developed an iPhone application for 
customers to review restaurant meals.16 In connection with the 
development of the application, Munchee Inc. offered and sold digital 
tokens known as “MUN” on a blockchain or distributed ledger.17 
 
 12. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). “The test is whether the scheme involves an investment of 
money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.” Id. 
at 301. 
 13. “Security” is defined under section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act. Securities Act of 
1933 §	2(1), 15 U.S.C. §	77b(a)(1) (2012). Securities include stock, notes, security-based 
derivatives, and “investment contracts.” Id. Investment contracts are investments of 
money in a common enterprise with the expectation of profits from the efforts of others. 
Howey, 328 U.S. at 298–99. 
 14. Munchee Inc., 118 SEC Docket 5, at 2. 
 15. For a discussion of the impact of ICOs on the venture capital industry, see Yuliya 
Chernova, Who Needs Venture Capital When You Have Initial Coin Offerings?, WALL ST. 
J. (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coin-mania-forces-vcs-to-sidelines-on-
cryptocurrency-1505388633 [https://perma.cc/X9ML-X37N (dark archive)]; Theodore 
Schleifer, Silicon Valley is Obsessed With ICOs—Here’s Why, RECODE (Sept. 19, 2017), 
https://www.recode.net/2017/9/19/16243110/initial-coin-offering-ico-explained-what-is-money-
bitcoin-digital-currency [https://perma.cc/QRT7-EMZM]. 
 16. Munchee Inc., 118 SEC Docket 5, at 1. 
 17. Id. For a basic overview of blockchain, see What is Blockchain Technology? A 
Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners, BLOCKGEEKS, https://blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-
blockchain-technology/ [http://perma.cc/6J9C-4U76]. 
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Ultimately, Munchee Inc. envisioned developing an “ecosystem” 
where users would “buy advertisements, write reviews, sell food, and 
conduct other transactions using MUN.”18 
More importantly, MUN served a financing purpose. Munchee 
Inc. offered MUN to the public to raise $15 million to finance the 
development of the iPhone application and other operational 
expenses.19 In the offering, the company proposed issuing 225 million 
MUN out of a finite supply of 500 million tokens.20 The company 
retained the remaining 275 million tokens to pay rewards to its 
application users, pay employees, and facilitate future advertising 
transactions.21 The company intended to use the proceeds from the 
offering to fund marketing and user acquisition, increase the size of 
the development team, pay legal and compliance fees, and “ensure 
the smooth operation of the MUN token ecosystem.”22 
To integrate the tokens into its business plan, Munchee Inc. 
proposed creating an ecosystem where content creators could earn 
tokens by using the application. For example, the company would use 
MUN to pay users to write food reviews.23 MUN could be used to 
make in-app purchases, and the company proposed working with 
restaurants to arrange agreements where its customers could use 
MUN to purchase restaurant meals.24 The company highlighted in its 
offering document, or white paper, that the increased use of the 
application would increase the value of the tokens by creating greater 
demand.25 
The company intended for investors to freely trade MUN. 
Munchee Inc.’s white paper noted that the company would “ensure 
that MUN token is available on a number of exchanges in varying 
jurisdictions” to ensure the conversion of the tokens to dollars or 
 
 18. Munchee Inc., 118 SEC Docket 5, at 1, 4. 
 19. Id. at 3. 
 20. SANJEEV VERMA, NGHI BUI & CHELSEA LAM, MUNCHEE TOKEN: A 
DECENTRALIZED BLOCKCHAIN BASED FOOD REVIEW/RATING SOCIAL MEDIA 
PLATFORM 10, 18 (2017), https://www.theventurealley.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/
2017/12/Munchee-White-Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/573Z-ST2B]. 
 21. Munchee Inc., 118 SEC Docket 5, at 3. 
 22. VERMA ET AL., supra note 20, at 20. The exact breakdown of the use of proceeds 
was as follows: (1) 35% to be “applied to marketing, user acquisition, and promotion”; (2) 
40% to be “applied to growing the development team”; (3) 10% to be applied to legal 
costs to make sure the company was compliant with relevant laws in all countries; and (4) 
15% to be “reserved for maintenance and to ensure the smooth operation of the MUN 
token ecosystem.” Id. 
 23. Munchee Inc., 118 SEC Docket 5, at 4. 
 24. Id. 
 25. VERMA ET AL., supra note 20, at 11. 
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other cryptocurrencies.26 Munchee Inc. represented that MUN would 
be tradeable on at least one exchange within thirty days of the 
offering, and the company would use its retained token holdings to 
support a liquid market in MUN.27 Additionally, when soliciting 
investors during the offering process, the company highlighted the 
potential for appreciation in the value of the tokens.28 To increase the 
value of the tokens as the company’s business improved, Munchee 
Inc. also indicated that it would take tokens out of circulation to 
increase their scarcity as restaurants signed up to use the 
application.29 
Given the offering’s material deviations from federal securities 
law,30 the Munchee Inc. ICO attracted the attention of the SEC. In 
December 2017, the SEC issued a cease and desist order against the 
company for violating section 5 of the Securities Act.31 In the 
adjudication, the SEC determined that MUN tokens were securities 
as defined in section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act,32 and the ICO 
constituted an unregistered offering of securities in violation of the 
Act.33 
 
 26. Id. at 11–12. 
 27. Id. at 20. 
 28. Quoc Nghi, 7 Reasons You Need to Join the Munchee Token Generation Event, 
MEDIUM (Oct. 29, 2017), https://blog.munchee.io/7-reasons-you-need-to-join-the-munchee-
token-generation-event-bf706e5dd068 [https://perma.cc/7SNY-Z48M]. In a bulleted list of 
reasons to invest in MUN tokens, the company highlighted that “[a]s more users get on 
the platform, the more valuable your MUN tokens will become.” Id. Munchee Inc.’s 
founders also hosted a podcast during the offering where they explained that “the more 
restaurants we have, the more quality content Munchee Inc. has, the value of the MUN 
token will go up.” Munchee Inc., 118 SEC Docket 5, at 5; see also Munchee, FACEBOOK 
(Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/muncheeapp/posts/508678116159681 [http://perma.cc/
3HGB-SRVB] (claiming “199% [gains] on MUN token at ICO price”). 
 29. VERMA ET AL., supra note 20, at 17. 
 30. For example, the Munchee Inc. ICO lacked a prospectus that complied with the 
Securities Act, and management promised significant gains in the value of the tokens that 
could not be substantiated. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. While Munchee 
Inc.’s ICO was not necessarily fraudulent, Securities Act requirements exist not only to 
prevent fraud but also to protect investors by requiring disclosure of material information 
about the issuer and to prohibit embellishment of the future performance of an issuer’s 
securities. See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html 
[https://perma.cc/9ZTL-WECK]. The lack of substantiated information given to investors 
in Munchee Inc.’s ICO triggered the need for the SEC to take action. 
 31. Munchee Inc., 118 SEC Docket 5, at 1–2 (finding that “Munchee violated Sections 
5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act”). 
 32. Id. at 2; see also 15 U.S.C. §	77b(a)(1) (2012) (defining “security” under the 
Securities Act). 
 33. Munchee Inc., 118 SEC Docket 5, at 9–10. 
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II.  THE SEC’S APPLICATION OF THE HOWEY TEST 
To determine that MUN were investment contracts and 
therefore securities under section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act,34 the 
SEC applied the Howey test.35 In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., the 
Supreme Court articulated a four-element test to determine whether 
an investment is an investment contract and therefore a security.36 
Under Howey, an investment contract exists if: (1) an investment of 
money is made, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with profits, (4) 
resulting only from the efforts of others.37 Investors in MUN clearly 
invested money in a common enterprise, so the SEC focused on 
whether investors purchased MUN with the expectation of profits 
derived from the efforts of others.38 
A. Investors Purchased MUN as For-Profit Investments 
In Howey, the Supreme Court focused on the actual purpose for 
which the company offered instruments to determine whether an 
investment was for profit.39 In Howey, the defendant sold shares that 
included both small parcels of land on an orange farm and a service 
contract under which the defendant would tend to the land.40 The 
defendant sold these packages exclusively to nonfarmer investors.41 
The individual plots were also too small to farm, leading the Court to 
hold that the land and service contract packages were intended to be 
for-profit speculative investments rather than purchases of productive 
land.42 Building on Howey, in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. 
Forman,43 the Supreme Court held that “form should be disregarded 
for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality” when 
 
 34. §	77b(a)(1). 
 35. See Munchee Inc., 118 SEC Docket 5, at 8. 
 36. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300–01 (1946). 
 37. See id. 
 38. In making this determination, the key issues are whether the investor purchased 
the asset to earn profits and whether those profits were primarily derived from the efforts 
of others. Id. at 299–300; see also Munchee Inc., 118 SEC Docket 5, at 8–9 (discussing 
MUN investors’ expectation of profits and that the “profits were to be derived from the 
significant entrepreneurial and managerial efforts of others”). There is some overlap in 
the analysis of these two prongs of the Howey test, as they both involve a determination of 
whether an investment asset was intended to be a passive investment. See Long v. Shultz 
Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 139 (5th Cir. 1989) (combining the final two elements of the 
Howey test into a single “third prong” including “the expectation of profits solely from the 
efforts of others”). 
 39. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299–300. 
 40. Id. at 295–96. 
 41. Id. at 296. 
 42. See id. at 299–300. 
 43. 421 U.S. 837 (1975). 
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determining whether an instrument was purchased for profit.44 In its 
investment contract analysis, the Supreme Court focused on the 
investor’s purpose in purchasing the contracts, further supporting the 
contention that the parties’ subjective understanding about the 
transaction is relevant to determine whether an investment is made 
for profit.45 Accordingly, courts applying Howey conduct an 
independent analysis of whether an asset is purchased for profit, 
regardless of how the parties labeled the asset. 
In its enforcement against Munchee Inc., the SEC correctly held 
that the company offered, and investors purchased, MUN as for-
profit investments rather than units of exchange. 46 Munchee Inc.’s 
white paper described the value and purpose of MUN as “utility 
tokens.”47 Utility tokens, or tokens used as a mode of exchange as 
well as a passive investment, provide access to a company’s product 
or service and are similar to currencies.48 Pure utility tokens are not 
intended to be investments and would generally not be subject to 
securities laws.49 In this instance, however, the SEC looked beyond 
the utility token label and examined the economic substance of 
MUN.50 The SEC’s analysis ultimately found that the tokens were 
offered as investments rather than units of exchange,51 noting that the 
offering materials and sales literature stressed the possibility of 
capital appreciation in the tokens.52 For example, one Facebook 
solicitation represented that investors in MUN should expect 199% 
gains on their ICO investment.53 The SEC also stressed that, at the 
time of the offering, there were no services currently available to 
 
 44. Id. at 848 (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)). 
 45. See id. at 858; see also SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 583–84 (2d 
Cir. 1982) (considering that a company exclusively targeted financial investors with no 
experience selling dental supplies as a factor in determining that licenses to sell dental 
supplies were intended to be passive investments). 
 46. Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445, 118 SEC Docket 5, at 8–9 (Dec. 
11, 2017). 
 47. See VERMA ET AL., supra note 20, at 3 (“[A]s this is a sale of utility tokens, it is 
not being provided through any of the exemptions under the United States Securities 
Act.”). 
 48. Josiah Wilmoth, ICO 101: Utility Tokens vs. Security Tokens, STRATEGIC COIN 
(Dec. 18, 2017), http://strategiccoin.com/ico-101-utility-tokens-vs-security-tokens/ [http://perma.cc/
7X79-758S]. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See Munchee Inc., 118 SEC Docket 5, at 9. 
 51. See id. at 8. 
 52. See id. at 9 (“Investors’ expectations were primed by Munchee’s marketing of the 
MUN token offering.”). 
 53. See id. at 6. 
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purchase with MUN.54 Finally, the company targeted its offering to 
cryptocurrency investors rather than potential application users.55 In 
its offering documents, the company compared MUN to other assets 
that had created profits for investors and targeted marketing of the 
offering to investors who had previously participated in those 
offerings.56 Although Munchee Inc. labeled MUN as “utility tokens,” 
it clearly offered MUN to investors as for-profit investments. 
B. MUN Investors Would Derive Profits “From the Efforts of 
Others,” Not User Contributions 
The SEC also correctly held that investors would derive profits 
“from the significant entrepreneurial and managerial efforts of 
others,” particularly by Munchee Inc. and its executives developing 
the MUN ecosystem.57 In SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,58 
the Ninth Circuit held that securities purchasers could offer their 
selling efforts, not just their money, as consideration so long as the 
returns from the investment were primarily dependent on the efforts 
of others.59 As a result, an investment may still qualify as a security 
even if the purchaser’s own efforts play a part in increasing the 
investment’s value.60 
Token holders submitting content to the application would, in 
part, drive appreciation in the value of MUN.61 Nevertheless, the SEC 
concluded that investors would still primarily derive profits from the 
efforts of others.62 In reaching this conclusion, the SEC focused on the 
importance of developing the MUN ecosystem to the value of the 
tokens.63 For example, the company committed to providing a 
secondary market for the tokens within thirty days of completing the 
offering and indicated that it would use reserve tokens to provide 
liquidity to generate an active trading market.64 This appeared to be a 
 
 54. See id. at 4 (describing the ecosystem that Munchee Inc. would create with the 
funding from the ICO). 
 55. Id. at 6 (“Munchee and its agents targeted the marketing of the MUN tokens 
offering to people with an interest in tokens or other digital assets that have in recent 
years created profits for early investors in ICOs.”). 
 56. Id. at 9. 
 57. Id. 
 58. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 59. See id. at 482. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Munchee Inc., 118 SEC Docket 5, at 8–9. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. VERMA ET AL., supra note 20, at 20; see also Munchee Inc., 118 SEC Docket 5, at 
9. 
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conscious effort on Munchee Inc.’s part to provide investors with 
liquidity to convert their investment to cash or other 
cryptocurrencies. The SEC also highlighted the company’s efforts to 
increase the value of the tokens as use of its application increased.65 
The value of the tokens would rise as more users joined the 
application.66 Additionally, the company planned to limit supply by 
removing tokens from circulation as more restaurants partnered with 
the application, which would further increase the value of the coins.67 
This also tied MUN’s performance to the company’s performance—
as the application gained more users, increased demand and the 
company’s efforts to limit supply would cause a corresponding 
increase in the value of MUN in the same manner that the value of 
corporate stock increases as a company increases earnings. 
The SEC persuasively applied the Howey test to conclude that 
MUN were investment contracts and therefore securities as defined 
by the Securities Act. Though the technology underlying MUN 
differed from traditional investments, MUN were offered as passive 
financial investments to individuals who never intended to use the 
company’s application. SEC Chairman Jay Clayton recently echoed 
this reasoning at a congressional oversight hearing, stating: 
[B]y and large, the structures of ICOs that I have seen involve 
the offer and sale of securities and directly implicate the 
securities registration requirements and other investor 
protection provisions of our federal securities laws. .	.	. Merely 
calling a token a “utility” token or structuring it to provide 
some utility does not prevent the token from being a security. 
Tokens and offerings that incorporate features and marketing 
efforts that emphasize the potential for profits based on the 
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others continue to 
contain the hallmarks of a security under U.S. law.68 
Chairman Clayton’s comments suggest that Munchee was not an 
exceptional case and that the SEC will continue to enforce securities 
laws in the context of an ICO. Future issuers will need to consider 
 
 65. See Munchee Inc., 118 SEC Docket 5, at 8–9. 
 66. Id. 
 67. VERMA ET AL., supra note 20, at 17. 
 68. Virtual Currencies: The Oversight Role of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 6–8 (2018) (statement of Jay 
Clayton, Chairman, SEC). 
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SEC regulations when determining whether an ICO is an effective 
way for their businesses to raise capital. 
III.  CONSEQUENCES OF THE MUNCHEE DECISION 
Given the persuasiveness of the SEC’s application of the Howey 
test and the unremarkable facts of the MUN offering, the SEC’s 
holding in Munchee will have far-reaching consequences for 
companies considering an ICO. The SEC will likely regulate most 
ICOs and subject them to registration requirements, which reduces 
flexibility for issuers and adds expense to the offering process. This 
calls into question their usefulness to issuers going forward. 
A. The SEC Will Enforce Section 5 Against ICOs in the Absence of 
Fraud 
Section 5 of the Securities Act does not require a showing of 
fraud to justify an SEC refusal order or a cease and desist 
proceeding.69 Despite this, many cryptocurrency promoters posited 
that the SEC would focus its efforts on preventing fraud and would 
not bring enforcement actions against issuers that sold unregistered 
cryptocurrencies to fund legitimate businesses.70 Munchee discredited 
this position.71 While Munchee Inc.’s ICO was unregistered and its 
sales literature contained overly promotional statements, the SEC did 
not find fraud.72 This confirms that section 5 imposes the same 
requirements and sanctions on cryptocurrency issuers as any other 
issuer. 
B. Cryptocurrency Issuers Likely Cannot Avoid the Definition of 
Security 
In Munchee, the SEC made clear that cryptocurrency issuers will, 
in most cases, be unable to structure their ICOs to circumvent 
securities laws. Under heightened SEC scrutiny, efforts to structure a 
 
 69. See Securities Act of 1933 §	5, 15 U.S.C. §	77h(b)–(c) (2012). 
 70. See Erin Griffith, The Hustlers Fueling Cryptocurrency’s Marketing Machine, 
WIRED (June 12, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/the-hustlers-fueling-cryptocurrencys-
marketing-machine/ [http://perma.cc/8UZZ-W9LH]. 
 71. See The SEC Just Issued a Warning to Cryptocurrency Investors, REUTERS (Dec. 
12, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/11/bitcoin-latest-sec-jay-clayton-warns-on-
cryptocurrencies-munchee-ico.html [http://perma.cc/7C4Z-25U5] (claiming the Munchee 
enforcement “showed [the] SEC would step in to address ICOs for registration violations 
even if there were no claims of fraud”). 
 72. See Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445, 118 SEC Docket 5, at 10 
(Dec. 11, 2017) (finding	section 5(a) and (c) violations but not fraud). 
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cryptocurrency offering to avoid the definition of a security will likely 
fail. 
First, though underdeveloped, Munchee Inc.’s platform was 
operational at the time of the ICO.73 This could have weakened the 
argument that the buildout of the platform was the primary generator 
of the returns on token investments.74 The SEC still found that 
management of the application and efforts to attract restaurants to 
the platform were sufficient to constitute “profit .	.	. resulting from 
Munchee Inc.’s efforts.”75 After Munchee, companies cannot avoid 
Securities Act registration requirements simply by claiming that the 
ICO-funded project is complete. 
Second, Munchee makes clear that labeling cryptocurrencies as 
utility tokens is insufficient to exclude cryptocurrencies from the 
definition of a security.76 Munchee Inc. had an existing platform on 
which the tokens could immediately serve as currencies rather than 
merely passive investments.77 Though the cryptocurrency community 
distinguishes between utility tokens and securities tokens,78 the SEC 
evaluates the substance of the transaction and whether the parties 
intended the instrument to be a passive investment.79 Accordingly, if 
offering materials for an ICO stress the investment benefits of tokens, 
and marketing efforts target coin investors rather than potential 
customers, the SEC will treat the cryptocurrency as a security 
regardless of its label. 
 
 73. See Roger Aitken, U.S. SEC Stops ‘Munching’ Munchee’s ICO After Reg 
Concerns Raised, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2017/
12/12/u-s-sec-stops-munching-munchees-ico-after-registration-concerns-raised/#39dbb6ab3144 
[http://perma.cc/PA99-LBAS] (noting that Munchee Inc. intended to raise funding 
through the ICO to improve an existing iPhone application). 
 74. See id. (discussing the vague use of a token’s “functionality” in efforts to avoid 
regulation). 
 75. Munchee Inc., 118 SEC Docket 5, at 8–9. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 9 (describing uses of MUN tokens on the Munchee Inc. app). 
 78. See, e.g., Micha Benoliel, Understanding the Difference Between Coins, Utility 
Tokens and Tokenized Securities, STARTUP GRIND (Aug. 8, 2017), https://medium.com/
startup-grind/understanding-the-difference-between-coins-utility-tokens-and-tokenized-securities-
a6522655fb91 [http://perma.cc/ZY9U-D4UJ] (distinguishing between utility tokens and 
“tokenized securities,” which are subject to SEC regulation); Wilmoth, supra note 48. 
 79. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848–49 (1974); SEC v. 
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). 
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C. Securities Act Registration Exemptions Are Likely Available but 
Unattractive 
The SEC’s reasoning in Munchee indicates that, with few 
exceptions, cryptocurrencies are securities. This raises the question of 
whether cryptocurrency issuers might still avoid registration by 
meeting one of several registration exemptions under the Securities 
Act. 
These exemptions necessarily involve restrictions on using the 
ICO structure and proceeds. Four groups of exemptions may be 
relevant to an ICO: Regulation D,80 Regulation A,81 the intrastate 
crowdfunding exemptions,82 and Regulation Crowdfunding.83 As a 
technical matter, companies could almost certainly structure an ICO 
to meet any one of these exemptions, but each has certain 
requirements that limit their attractiveness to ICO issuers. Three key 
drawbacks are (1) restrictions on transferability, (2) restrictions on 
solicitation, and (3) capital raising caps. 
1.  Restrictions on Transferability 
First, several registration exemptions restrict investors from 
freely transferring their shares. Section 506 of Regulation D restricts 
resales of securities purchased in the exempt offering.84 SEC Rule 144 
provides a safe harbor for compliance with the restriction on 
transferability requirement.85 For nonreporting companies,86 a 
minimum of one year must elapse before the investor purchasing in 
the exempt offering may transfer the securities to a secondary 
purchaser.87 
Intrastate offering exemptions also restrict resale by purchasers 
in the offering. Both the intrastate offering exemption and the 
intrastate crowdfunding exemption require that securities purchased 
in the offering “come to rest” with residents of the state in which the 
 
 80. 17 C.F.R. §§	230.500–.506 (2018). 
 81. Id. §§	230.251–.263. 
 82. 15 U.S.C. §	77c(a)(11) (2012); 17 C.F.R. §§	230.147–.147A (2018). 
 83. 15 U.S.C. §	77d(a)(6) (Supp. 2017). 
 84. §	230.506. 
 85. Id. §	230.144. 
 86. Nonreporting companies are companies not subject to periodic reporting 
requirements under section 13 or section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Given that ICO issuers almost certainly have not previously issued securities to the public, 
they are almost certainly nonreporting companies. 
 87. 17 C.F.R. §	230.144(d)(1)(ii) (2018). 
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offering took place.88 SEC Rule 147, which provides a safe harbor for 
the intrastate offering exemption, and Rule 147A, which provides 
requirements to comply with the intrastate crowdfunding exemption, 
both restrict resales to investors outside the state within six months of 
the offering.89 
Restrictions on resale significantly limit the attractiveness of 
exempt ICOs to potential investors. Venture capital funds that have 
participated in ICOs have cited liquidity as a major reason to 
purchase cryptocurrencies rather than purchase equity.90 It may take a 
venture capital fund several years to exit a traditional equity 
investment in a start-up business, while cryptocurrencies are readily 
convertible to cash.91 Restrictions on resale, however, eliminate this 
advantage without providing the benefit of control that a venture 
capital investor typically receives from an equity investment. 
Restrictions on transfers also limit the usefulness of the intrastate 
offering exemptions. Before Munchee, ICOs were global in scale.92 
Solicitations were made over the internet and could reach investors 
all over the world. Limiting an ICO’s reach to one state would greatly 
reduce its utility to issuers. 
2.  Restrictions on Solicitation 
Restrictions on solicitation are a second limitation to exempt 
ICOs. Rule 506(b) of Regulation D prohibits general solicitation.93 As 
a result, issuers offering securities under the exemption cannot 
advertise the offering to the public.94 Rule 506(c) permits general 
solicitation to accredited investors but allows no more than thirty-five 
 
 88. See, e.g., Busch v. Carpenter, 827 F.2d 653, 656 (10th Cir. 1987) (“The SEC has 
consistently maintained that a distribution of securities must have ‘actually come to rest in 
the hands of resident investors—persons purchasing for investment and not with a view to 
further distribution or for purposes of resale.’” (quoting Opinion on the Definition of 
Parent, Securities Act Release No. 1256, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,958, 10,959 (May 29, 1937))). 
 89. 17 C.F.R. §§	230.147(e), .147A(e) (2018). 
 90. Richard Kastelein, What Initial Coin Offerings Are, and Why VC Firms Care, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 24, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/what-initial-coin-offerings-are-
and-why-vc-firms-care [http://perma.cc/U67H-KDR3]. 
 91. Id. Cryptocurrencies can be freely traded like public equity investments, whereas 
equity investments in private, start-up businesses tend to be hard to exit and are 
considered long-term investments. Id. 
 92. See, e.g., VERMA ET AL., supra note 20, at 4 (noting “[m]any international 
jurisdictions have indicated that token sales may qualify as sales of investment contracts”). 
 93. 17 C.F.R. §	230.506(b)(2) (2018). 
 94. Id. 
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nonaccredited95 investors to purchase securities.96 Both provisions of 
Regulation D also require that purchasers be knowledgeable, 
sophisticated, and able to understand and bear the risk of the 
investment.97 Because cryptocurrency issuers tend to be little-known 
start-up businesses, solicitation is important to garner sufficient 
investor interest to conduct the ICO. Rule 506(b) offerings are 
therefore likely infeasible for cryptocurrency issuers because access to 
the general public is limited or entirely unavailable. If the issuer 
instead relies on Rule 506(c), compliance with the accredited-investor 
requirement compels the issuer to verify the identities of the 
investors.98 Verification violates one of the fundamental principles of 
cryptocurrencies—anonymity of transactions.99 
The intrastate offering exemptions also impose restrictions on 
solicitation. Section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act prohibits out-of-
state offerees.100 The intrastate crowdfunding exemption under Rule 
147A relaxes this requirement considerably by permitting issuers to 
make offers to nonresidents but still prohibits issuers from selling 
securities to nonresident offerees.101 Territorial restrictions on the 
offering greatly limit its scope and the issuer’s ability to raise capital. 
Regulation Crowdfunding also significantly limits solicitation by 
issuers. Regulation Crowdfunding mandates use of a funding portal, a 
crowdfunding intermediary through which investors can purchase 
securities, to offer and sell securities.102 Funding portals must be 
 
 95. Accredited investors include institutional investors and individuals with a net 
worth of greater than $1,000,000, excluding the value of their personal residence, or with 
annual income of greater than $200,000. Id. §	230.501(a). Married individuals are 
considered accredited investors if their joint net worth exceeds $1,000,000 or their joint 
annual net income exceeds $300,000. Id. §	230.501(a)(5). Because many ICOs seek smaller 
investments from large groups of individual investors, restrictions on the ability of issuers 
to market ICOs to nonaccredited investors impedes the typical offering process. 
 96. Id. §	230.506(c)(2)(i). 
 97. OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. & ADVOCACY, SEC, INVESTOR BULLETIN: PRIVATE 
PLACEMENTS UNDER REGULATION D (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/
investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_privateplacements.html [https://perma.cc/MDR9-5DH9]. 
 98. 17 C.F.R. §	230.506(c)(2)(ii) (2018). 
 99. Bitcoin Transactions Aren’t as Anonymous as Everyone Hoped, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608716/bitcoin-transactions-arent-as-
anonymous-as-everyone-hoped/ [https://perma.cc/86D3-UT5A]. Blockchain transactions 
are intended to be anonymous, though anonymity is not perfect because online 
pseudonyms could possibly be linked to their user. Id. Requiring verification of parties 
involved in a cryptocurrency transaction would eliminate “[o]ne of the great promises of 
this technology.” Id. 
 100. See 15 U.S.C. §	77c(a)(11) (2012). 
 101. 17 C.F.R. §	230.147A (2018). 
 102. Id. §	227.100(a)(3). 
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registered with the SEC and meet certain requirements.103 The issuer 
itself may not advertise the offering except in a notice that directs 
investors to the funding portal and gives basic factual information 
about the offering and the issuer’s business.104 The mandated form of 
solicitation in Regulation Crowdfunding threatens one of the key 
promises of cryptocurrency offerings—decentralization.105 SEC 
regulation already threatens decentralization, and mandating 
distribution through certain broker-dealers and funding portals would 
totally centralize cryptocurrency offerings. 
3.  Capital Raising Caps 
A final limitation on the use of federal securities exemptions to 
conduct an ICO are caps restricting the amount of capital that can be 
raised in an exempt offering. Rule 504 of Regulation D, Regulation 
A, and Regulation Crowdfunding all impose caps on the amount of 
capital that can be raised under each exemption.106 In 2017, the 
average amount raised in an ICO was $12.7 million.107 The largest 
ICOs skew this number,108 but it is still well above the $5 million and 
$1.07 million caps on capital raising within a twelve-month period 
imposed by Rule 504 and Regulation Crowdfunding, respectively.109 
Regulation A also caps the amount of capital that can be raised 
using the exemption.110 The exemption provides for two tiers of 
 
 103. Id. §	227.400. 
 104. Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers, SEC 
(Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-051316.htm#4 
[https://perma.cc/4NGU-SJL9]. 
 105. See Mike Orcutt, Bitcoin and Ethereum Have a Hidden Power Structure and It’s 
Just Been Revealed, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/
s/610018/bitcoin-and-ethereum-have-a-hidden-power-structure-and-its-just-been-revealed/ 
[https://perma.cc/QCU6-MPJU]. Proponents consider decentralization advantageous 
because it reduces the expenses and increased transaction charges that result from 
government and central bank actions. See Jennifer Spencer, The Risks and Benefits of 
Digital Currency, ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/
302778 [https://perma.cc/Y4PW-M7C8]. 
 106. See 17 C.F.R. §§	230.504(b)(2), 227.100(a)(1) (2018). 
 107. Oscar Williams-Grut, Only 48% of ICOs Were Successful Last Year—but Startups 
Still Managed to Raise $56 Billion, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 31, 2018), www.businessinsider.com/
how-much-raised-icos-2017-tokendata-2017-2018-1 [https://perma.cc/BW4M-VMYE]. 
 108. Id. “[T]he 10 largest ICOs in 2017 raised nearly $1.4 billion and roughly 25% of 
the total capital raised [in ICOs] in 2017.” Id. 
 109. §§	230.504(b)(2), 227.100(a)(1). 
 110. OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. & ADVOCACY, SEC, INVESTOR BULLETIN: 
REGULATION A (2015), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_regulationa.html 
[https://perma.cc/9V4N-M6JE]. 
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offerings.111 Under Tier I, issuers can offer up to $20 million of 
securities in a twelve-month period without complying with SEC 
reporting requirements.112 Tier II allows the issuer to raise up to $50 
million in a twelve-month period but imposes higher disclosure 
requirements.113 Regulation A’s caps are high enough to 
accommodate the average ICO and would have accommodated 
Munchee Inc.’s ICO. Regulation A is therefore a legitimate option 
for many cryptocurrency issuers, but it still fails to adequately remove 
burdensome regulation. Regulation A offerings are more heavily 
regulated than other exempt offerings—like IPOs, they require 
considerable disclosures and are subject to SEC oversight.114 
IV.  POST-MUNCHEE, ICOS OFFER FEW BENEFITS OVER 
TRADITIONAL SECURITIES OFFERINGS 
Most ICOs are likely securities offerings following Munchee. 
Accordingly, issuers must either register their ICO with the SEC and 
comply with the Securities Act or file under an exemption that may 
not fit their specific situation. The important question after Munchee, 
therefore, is why an issuer would offer cryptocurrencies when 
regulatory requirements are the same as an offering of any other 
security. Cryptocurrency offerings are unlikely to be the same low-
cost, unregulated forms of financing they were before Munchee, 
substantially altering the cost-benefit analysis. 
A. Remaining Benefits of an ICO 
There are still some advantages to raising capital with an ICO, 
though they fall well short of the prior advantage of avoiding SEC 
regulation. First, owners can seek external funding without diluting 
their interests in the business’s profits.115 Because their businesses are 
not selling equity, the owners retain 100% of the residual profits. 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See, e.g., Tom Zanki, Reg A+ ‘Mini-IPOs’ Make Headway with Small Companies, 
LAW360 (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/971717/reg-a-mini-ipos-make-
headway-with-small-companies [https://perma.cc/TW4H-5K3A (dark archive)]. For 
example, in contrast to Regulation D, Regulation A mandates preparation of an offering 
circular for investors, which is essentially a scaled-down prospectus. See KATHERINE K. 
DELUCA ET AL., MCGUIREWOODS LLP, A GUIDE TO REGULATION A+ 9 (2015), 
http://media.mcguirewoods.com/publications/2015/White-Paper-on-Regulation-Aplus.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6QAQ-5T2R]. 
 115. Yoolim Lee, Venture Capital or ICO? Startups Face Cash-Raising Dilemma, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 21, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-21/to-ico-
or-not-to-ico-that-is-the-question-for-today-s-startups [https://perma.cc/8AJD-C7JA]. 
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Going forward, issuers could raise capital through registered ICOs as 
a way of obtaining financing for the business without diluting 
founders’ ownership interests in the underlying profits. The value of 
the cryptocurrency would likely relate to the performance of the 
company, but cryptocurrency holders would not own any entitlement 
to the business’s profits. Owners who do not want to give up equity 
and whose business cannot support debt financing may still consider 
raising capital through a registered ICO.116 
Cryptocurrencies also prevent dilution of a founder’s ownership 
and control of the business. Typically, when a company receives 
venture capital financing, it must give up some degree of control over 
its business plan in exchange, as well as a board seat.117 In theory, 
venture capital investors provide the start-up business’s board with 
expertise and experience, as well as help the company refine and 
execute its business plan.118 In practice, however, venture capital’s 
impact on a company can be mixed, with some suggesting venture 
capital funds often add negative value.119 Regardless, founders want 
to maintain control over their vision for the company and often cite 
control over governance as a larger concern than financing.120 A 
business could better prioritize the quality of the product or service 
by choosing to undertake an ICO. Doing so could reduce pressure 
from financial investors to reduce costs and prioritize short-term 
financial returns.121 If a founder wishes to retain full control of the 
board and corporate policy, she may find an ICO to be an attractive 
alternative to venture capital financing. 
 
 116. Id. (describing a start-up’s decision to raise $25 million in an ICO rather than 
through traditional venture capital funding). 
 117. See Chernova, supra note 15; Samer Hamadeh & Adam Dinow, What You Need 
to Know About Startup Boards, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 5, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/
2016/11/05/what-you-need-to-know-about-startup-boards/ [https://perma.cc/MR59-4QYD]. 
 118. Joseph Chan, How Do Venture Capital Investors Add Value to Portfolio Companies?, 
PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP (Oct. 2007), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/
images/content/2/4/v2/2430/3FE607E19A8B7AAC87B931FDD8614997.pdf [https://perma.cc/
E3L9-WCRA] (describing the added value of venture capital to start-up businesses). 
 119. Kim-Mai Cutler, Vinod Khosla: 70-80% of VCs Add Negative Value to Startups, 
TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 11, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/09/11/vinod-khosla/ 
[https://perma.cc/R2NJ-JL49]. 
 120. See Danny Crichton, Do Good Companies ICO?, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 16, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/16/do-good-companies-ico/ [https://perma.cc/7YGE-JGZD]. 
 121. Kastelein, supra note 90. 
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B. Costs of Including Cryptocurrency in the Capital Structure 
For most businesses, the negative business implications of an 
ICO, especially with the threat of regulatory enforcement after 
Munchee, dwarf the few benefits of ICO issuances discussed above. 
Although there are remaining benefits to small businesses, like 
Munchee Inc., that raise capital through a registered or exempt ICO, 
the costs of SEC regulation likely outweigh those benefits. In 
particular, the cost of folding cryptocurrency into the company’s 
business model and the threat of reduced access to capital are 
substantial. 
First, incorporating cryptocurrency into a business is often 
unnecessary and may confuse the business model. An Ernst & Young 
study found that most white papers failed to adequately justify the 
incorporation of blockchain into the company’s business models.122 
Rather, “blockchain” and “cryptocurrency” serve as buzzwords to 
lure investors into an offering.123 While helpful in attracting financing, 
incorporating cryptocurrency and maintaining a cryptocurrency 
exchange is expensive.124 Incorporating a cryptocurrency network into 
the business model also introduces cybersecurity risks that would not 
otherwise exist.125 Cryptocurrencies are vulnerable to hacking and 
theft, which can lead to substantial liability.126 
Incorporating cryptocurrency into a business model also distracts 
from the underlying business. Many ICOs are undertaken by 
companies without any developed business.127 For these companies, 
the ICO acts as a distraction since the time, effort, and money used to 
create a cryptocurrency network can often be put to better use 
 
 122. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 3, at 11 (“White papers contain many clichés that 
attract inexperienced investors, with no reasonable justification for blockchain use.”). 
 123. See id. 
 124. See Dmitry Gurkovskiy, Make Your Own Cryptocurrency: Not Difficult, but 
Expensive, NASDAQ (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/make-your-own-
cryptocurrency-not-difficult-but-expensive-cm852027 [https://perma.cc/TZ4N-EQR4]. 
 125. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 3, at 30–34; see also THREATMETRIX, Q4 2017 
CYBERCRIME REPORT 37 (2017), https://www.threatmetrix.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/
02/cybercrime-2017-q4-1518132356.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQT4-KKBT]. 
 126. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(A) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934: The DAO, 2017 WL 7184670, at *9–10. 
 127. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 3, at 16 (finding that 84% of companies undertaking 
an ICO were at the idea stage, while only 5% of ICOs were undertaken by companies with 
running projects); see also Popper, supra note 1 (“‘Promising to build’ is the operative 
phrase here, because in almost every case the services that will supposedly make these 
coins valuable have not yet been finished.”). 
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improving the fundamentals of the business.128 Munchee Inc. provides 
a great example of a business for which incorporating cryptocurrency 
was an unnecessary distraction and perhaps a cover for an 
underdeveloped business plan.129 The MUN network was an 
unnecessary substitute for a cash exchange network; instead of 
developing a cryptocurrency exchange, the company could have 
focused on monetizing its core restaurant review application. 
Second, many venture capital investors interpret a company 
undertaking an ICO, rather than seeking financing through more 
traditional channels, as a signal that the company has an unattractive 
business plan or poor financial performance. Given limited 
information, venture capital investors look at certain signals when 
determining whether to invest in a start-up business.130 Companies 
that undertake ICOs tend to be companies that cannot obtain venture 
capital or other private financing, either because of a weak business 
model or because management is seeking financing too early for an 
unproven, underdeveloped business.131 Many venture capital investors 
view companies that choose to undertake ICOs as among the lowest-
quality companies in search of easily accessible cash.132 As a result, 
undertaking an ICO indicates weakness to venture capital investors 
who might otherwise invest in the company, potentially precluding 
access to future capital.133 Lack of access to capital beyond the initial 
round of financing is a growth killer for an early-stage business.134 
Finally, incorporating cryptocurrency into a business model may 
also harm the future value of the start-up. Investors typically apply a 
“conglomerate discount” to undervalue business models 
incorporating multiple lines of business.135 A conglomerate discount 
 
 128. See Chernova, supra note 15 (“There’s a reason that there’s milestone financing in 
venture capital .	.	. [i]t’s super distracting [for founders] when there’s so much money.” 
(second alteration in original)). 
 129. See Crichton, supra note 120 (discussing how low-quality companies tend to 
gravitate toward ICOs). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Lee, supra note 115. 
 132. See Crichton, supra note 120. 
 133. Id. (noting that “an ICO may send a negative signal to traditional equity investors 
that [a company] failed at fundraising and therefore [is] choosing the next best 
alternative”). 
 134. See, e.g., Jim Duffy, Zombie Startups: Why Are Entrepreneurs Failing to Grow 
Their Businesses?, GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/small-business-
network/2017/aug/07/zombie-startups-entrepreneurs-failing-grow-businesses [https://perma.cc/
J2X7-8QYN]. 
 135. See, e.g., R. Hal Mason & Maurice B. Goudzwaard, Performance of Conglomerate 
Firms: A Portfolio Approach, 31 J. FIN. 39, 47 (1976); see also Stefan Heppelmann & 
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could likely be applied to a business like Munchee Inc. that attaches a 
token exchange to its core business. In the short run, start-up 
valuations benefit from the interest surrounding blockchain 
technology and cryptocurrency.136 As the novelty of these 
technologies dissipates in the long run, however, investors may treat 
these companies like others with multiple business lines and 
undervalue their core businesses. 
Undertaking an ICO poses a significant risk to future access to 
capital, the consequences of which are often severe. Incorporating 
cryptocurrency into the business model still makes sense if developing 
a network of exchange is core to the business.137 Forcing a 
cryptocurrency exchange into the business model, however, no longer 
makes sense to a small business given the potentially severe costs and 
reduced benefits. 
V.  EVALUATING THE SEC’S DECISION 
Though far-reaching, the SEC’s decision was correct from a 
policy perspective and in line with its mission of protecting investors; 
maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitating capital 
formation.138 
Regulating ICOs protects investors. The SEC requires issuers to 
disclose all material information so investors have all the necessary 
information to make an informed investment decision, regardless of 
the underlying quality of the investment. Cryptocurrency issuers 
typically release white paper disclosure documents with offerings.139 
However, prior to Munchee, unregulated white paper disclosure 
documents were often riddled with material misstatements and 
omissions of fact.140 As a result, the disclosures failed to provide 
investors with sufficient information to make an informed decision to 
 
Marco Hoffleith, Holding Structure—from Conglomerate Discount to Management Value 
Added, 36 STERN STEWART RES. 1, 3 (2009). 
 136. See Karsten Wöckener et al., Regulation of Initial Coin Offerings, WHITE & CASE 
LLP (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/regulation-initial-coin-
offerings [https://perma.cc/J2YK-7V3G] (reporting that “[t]he international ICO market is 
operating at its highest levels .	.	. but the market is anticipated to continue the increase”). 
 137. Id. (explaining how blockchain tracks cryptocurrency trades “securely across 
independent network components”). 
 138. OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. & ADVOCACY, SEC, THE ROLE OF THE SEC, 
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/role-sec [https://perma.cc/2KFU-LBAD]. 
 139. See, e.g., VERMA ET AL., supra note 20, at 4. 
 140. For a recent and particularly egregious allegation of material misstatements and 
omissions highlighting the problems posed by unregulated cryptocurrency white papers, 
see First Amended Complaint at 2–3, SEC v. AriseBank, No. 3:18-CV-00186 (N.D. Tex. 
Feb. 2, 2018). 
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purchase tokens in an ICO, and the SEC exercised its authority to 
protect the investing public. 
Start-ups, like Munchee Inc., that raise capital through ICOs also 
tend to skip many of the safeguards associated with sales of other 
types of securities.141 For example, cryptocurrency issuers often do not 
check if they are dealing with accredited investors.142 Nonaccredited 
investors may not fully understand the risks associated with 
cryptocurrency investments or have the guidance necessary to invest 
wisely.143 The risk that cryptocurrency investors might not fully 
understand the instruments they are purchasing exacerbates the 
problems posed by deficient disclosure documents and necessitates 
SEC intervention. 
SEC regulation of cryptocurrency markets also promotes 
efficient capital formation. As mentioned in Section IV.B, the vast 
majority of companies raising capital through ICOs do not have 
operating businesses.144 In many cases the promised services or 
products are never developed, and the cryptocurrency serves as 
nothing more than a financial instrument.145 Despite this, investments 
in ICOs approached $4 billion in 2017.146 The prevalence of shell-
company ICOs dilutes the amount of capital available for investment 
and leads to inefficient capital formation. Raising the cost of financing 
through an ICO should dissuade questionable businesses without real 
capital needs from resorting to an ICO, allowing capital to flow to 
legitimate projects. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the SEC’s decision in Munchee was in line with 
existing Supreme Court precedent defining the Securities Act’s reach, 
as well as the SEC’s mandate to protect investors. Therefore, the 
 
 141. Camila Russo, Ethereum Co-founder Says Crypto Coin Market Is a Time-bomb, 
BLOOMBERG (Jul. 18, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-18/ethereum-
co-founder-says-crypto-coin-market-is-ticking-time-bomb [https://perma.cc/8NH6-PQ2C]. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See SEC, RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE: 
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decision will have serious implications for the ICO industry going 
forward. As one blockchain executive stated in the wake of Munchee, 
“ICOs operating in the Wild West of finance isn’t sustainable. .	.	. If it 
talks like a duck and walks like a duck, the SEC will say it’s a 
duck.”147 The SEC appears committed to bringing cryptocurrency 
market regulation to the standard of other securities markets, and it 
remains to be seen if ICOs continue to be a useful form of financing 
for start-up businesses when brought under SEC regulation. 
MATTHEW J. HIGGINS** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 147. Russo, supra note 141. 
 **  I would like to thank my primary editor, Robby Lucas, my topic editor, Kelly 
Nash, and all other members of the Law Review who helped turn an idea into this Recent 
Development. I would also like to thank Professor Thomas Lee Hazen for a great 
introduction to securities law. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 220 (2018) 
242 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
	
 
